The NFL Blueprint: How College Football Teams Are Reshaping Power

Schools are now hiring experienced GMs, often with NFL backgrounds, to oversee recruiting strategies, negotiate NIL budgets, and construct rosters like professional franchises. Actually, 8 of the 12 qualifiers in the College Football Playoff already hired a GM? OU Sooners were lagging behind, but their latest hire, Jim Nagy, will fill that void.

• Nagy spent two decades as a regional and national scout for top-tier NFL franchises, winning four Lombardi Trophies. 

• He has been running the Senior Bowl since 2018. 45 of the top 100 picks in last year’s draft were senior bowl graduates, per CBS Sports analyst Adam Breneman. 

The Sooners' decision to hire an ex-NFL scout like Nagy is understandable, given their disappointing record last season. Nagy's recent interview with the New York Jets also highlights his credibility as a candidate.

• The Sooners finished the season with an overall record of 6-7. Their record against SEC Opponents? 2-6.

• The team ranked 100th in offensive points per game, averaging only 24.0 per match. 

We are sure Nagy will look at these numbers. But that’s not the only reason why he has been hired.

In today’s CFB landscape, programs are competing as much for NIL dollars as they are for talent. The hiring of NFL-style GMs isn’t just about scouting—it’s about navigating a multi-million dollar player market where recruitment is as much about brand value as it is about performance. Nagy will play a critical role in maximizing NIL deals, securing sponsorship dollars, and keeping Sooners financially competitive.

Why This Move Makes Business Sense for Sooners

Athletic programs are grappling with a new reality: how to funnel more money into the pockets of their top stars. The bulk of it has to come from NILs. However, after the House v. NCAA settlement agreement, schools have to implement direct institutional athletic payments of up to $20,500,000 per year. 

With NIL money skyrocketing, programs must be strategic. It’s no longer just about raising money—it’s about spending smartly, managing rosters like assets, and leveraging sponsorships like investments. That’s why hiring NFL-caliber executives has become essential. Certainly, their financial perks reveal how much weight college teams are putting on this role.

✅ Sean Magee signed a three-year contract worth $1.08 million with Michigan, with a base salary of $775K/year.

✅ Marshall Malchow’s base salary is $550,000 at Oregon.

✅ Derek Miller inked with Texas A&M for a $500K/annum deal.

✅ LSU’s Austin Thomas is slated to earn $425,000 this season, the same as Mississippi’s Billy Glasscock. [Source: USAToday]

So, GMs are not just recruiters with stat sheets on both hands anymore. Teams demand them to be savvy negotiators who can bring in more donations and make wise choices of recruiting players based on both their performance and brand value. In Michael Lombardi’s words, “To do this the right way, you have to have a grading system and have to be able to put a dollar sign on each player.” 

Folks like Nagy bring exactly that to the table. While announcing Nagy’s recruitment, Randall Stephenson, an advisor to Sooners, said, “Few industries, inside or outside the world of sports, have experienced the pace and magnitude of change we are witnessing in intercollegiate athletics.” The former AT&T CEO was by no means exaggerating, and these trends evince why Sooners and others are hiring general managers with NFL backgrounds. 

Why College Football is Starting to Look Like the NFL

This new model mirrors that of NFL franchises, yes. But here is the deal: the current market scenario in college football also mirrors that of the NFL. Any guesses on how much it costs to build a college football team roster? 

• Quarterbacks: $500,000 to $800,000 (Can go north of $2M).

• Defensive Linesman: Roughly $500K

• Offensive Lines: $350,000 to $500,000

• Running Backs: $200K $300K 

• Linebackers: $100K to $300K

• Wide Receivers: $75K to $300K

• Defensive Back: $120,000 to $225,000. [Source: CBS Sports]

It’s not a surprise that college footballers dominate the list of highest-earning college athletes.

Against this landscape of ever-growing valuation, is it really a surprise that more NFL personnel are moving into college football? Here is what Nagy said in his first press conference as Sooners GM: “It's not just going to be me from the NFL. We're going for more of a pro model. So it's going to be important to bring in some more people.”

Expect a seismic shift in power—from coaches to front offices. In turn, that will curtail some of the independence that head coaches enjoyed. But given that football coaches were overburdened with tasks outside their traditional responsibilities, more and more colleges are following suit.

🏢 SI reports that South Florida and Boise State are already planning to establish a multi-person front office to accelerate revenue generation, NIL development, and education. 

🗂️ GMs like Andrew Luck at Stanford have been handed an all-encompassing responsibility from roster management to making strategic choices.

🏟️ The rise of GMs in college football does indicate the corporatization of the sport that CFB has avoided so far.

This shift isn’t just about how college football is structured—it’s about who holds the power. Some coaches will resist, unwilling to give up control, but the programs that embrace this shift will gain a competitive edge. As front offices expand and NIL money reshapes recruitment, expect college football to look even more like the NFL—where executives, not just coaches, build dynasties. 

Major League Baseball is on the brink of another labor dispute. With the current collective bargaining agreement (CBA) expiring, owners are preparing to push for a salary cap—a move that could lead to an offseason lockout. But the MLB Players Association, led by Tony Clark, isn’t backing down. If history is any indication, a stalemate could have costly consequences for the league, its players, and its financial future.

Financial Impact on the League

The argument in favor of a salary cap is that it would allow more parity among MLB teams. Per a report on Direct Insider, last year, the Mets’ roster was valued at $311M, compared to Oakland Athletics’ $62M. Whereas, the Dodgers’ roster was valued at $225M – a third of which was Ohtani’s $68M payroll.

Insider sources hint that owners might drive a hard bargain this time. If that happens, an offseason lockout doesn’t look very unlikely. It’s uncannily reminiscent of the lead-up to the 2021-22 season when MLB headed for a lockout. 

If a similar situation plays out later this year, it will certainly block MLB’s major revenue stream. MLB’s total revenue has enjoyed an upward trend in the last decade, reaching $12.1B last year. It is expected that tickets formed a chunk of that, as seen from this breakdown of the 2023 revenue below.

Derek McLaughlin from the University of Nebraska conducted a study to judge a lockout’s potential impact at that time. It revealed that a lockout doesn’t just delay games—it hits the league’s bottom line hard.

📉 In 2021, MLB risked a $226M loss in ticket revenue if 10% of games were canceled.

⏳ The 1994-95 strike had an even longer-lasting impact—it took 12 years for MLB to recover its pre-strike attendance levels.

❌ With MLB’s total revenue reaching $12.1B last year, a work stoppage could severely disrupt its financial momentum.

So, a lockout will throw a monkey wrench into whatever plans MLB has to maintain the small gains in attendance they made. Not to speak of the reputation being hampered because of a stalemate. And history shows that fan sentiment around lockouts doesn’t recover overnight:

• 1995: MLB attendance dropped 20% post-strike.

• 2021: A FinanceBuzz survey found that 47% of fans planned to spend less on MLB post-lockout. In an AP survey, 73% of hardcore fans said a lockout negatively impacted their view of the league.

The timing of a lockout couldn’t be worse. ESPN has already exited its long-term broadcasting deal, leaving MLB scrambling for a new partner. A prolonged labor dispute would further devalue its remaining deals, raising concerns among both media networks and sponsors. That too at a time when MLB is already battling a volatile viewership, as the chart below clearly shows.

Labor disputes also erode corporate sponsorship confidence. With declining viewership and unstable scheduling, brands face greater risk in aligning with the league. If fan engagement drops—just as it did after the 1994-95 strike and the 2021 lockout—MLB could see lower sponsorship renewals and decreased advertising revenue.

Broader Implications for Baseball 

Regardless of the scale of the lockout – be it 232 days in 1994 or 3 months in 2021 – it has left a bigger impact each time. From 1973 to 2021, a stalemate has halted the game seven times, and the repercussions of some can still be felt.

1973: The first lockout offered players more bargaining power over salary disputes. 

1976: The second one changed how contracts were created and negotiations were carried out.

1981: Free agency was modified so that owners receive compensation for losing a player.

1985: Players received a share of MLB’s massive broadcast deal.

1990: The minimum salary was hiked to $100,000 from $68,000.

1994: The owners unsuccessfully fought for a salary cap.

2021: Luxury tax was introduced. 

It remains to be seen how the potential lockout plays out next season. If the team owners push for the salary cap, resistance will come in the form of Tony Clark. The length of the negotiations will depend on each team’s flexibility. However, from Clark’s emphasis on various platforms, it is evident that he hasn’t wavered from his place of belief.

In short, the MLB is at a crossroads. If owners push too hard for a salary cap, a costly lockout is inevitable. If negotiations drag on, the league risks alienating its audience, destabilizing potential broadcast deals, and repeating financial misadventures. Clearly, MLB can’t afford another extended labor dispute. The question now is whether owners and players will heed that warning—or let history repeat itself.